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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the 
annual Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research 
projects funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote 
speakers, plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show 
and social events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid 
environment where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry 
officials, accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate 
on finding applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and 
processes within the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of 
industry and academia, the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and 
collaborations which can identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, 
contract, financial, logistics and program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, 
electronic copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, 
please visit our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
Symposium during the third week of May, please visit our conference website at: 
www.researchsymposium.org  
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Dynamic Cost-contingency Management: A Method for Reducing 
Project Costs While Increasing the Probability of Success 
Presenter: Edouard Kujawski is an associate professor in the Systems Engineering Department at the 
Naval Postgraduate School.  His research and teaching interests include the design and analysis of high-
reliability/availability systems, risk analysis, and decision theory.  He received a PhD in theoretical physics 
from MIT, following which he spent several years in research and teaching physics.  He has held lead 
positions at General Electric, Lockheed-Martin and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.  He has 
contributed to the design of particle accelerators and detectors, space observatories, commercial 
communication systems, the Space Station, and nuclear power plants.  He was a participant and 
contributor to the Lockheed Martin LM21 Risk Management Best Practices and the original INCOSE 
Systems Engineering Handbook.  He is a member of the San Francisco Bay Area Chapter of INCOSE 
and has served on the board of directors. 
Edouard Kujawski, PhD, Associate Professor 
Department of Systems Engineering 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, Ca 93943 
Phone: (831) 656-3324 (Office),  
(510) 289-1144 (Mobile) 
E-mail: ekujawsk@nps.edu 
Abstract 
In the real world, “Money Allocated is Money Spent" (MAIMS).  As a consequence, cost 
underruns are rarely available to protect against cost overruns, while task overruns are passed 
on to the total project cost.  The combination of the probabilistic aspects of project costs and the 
MAIMS principle have important implications for budget allocation and the management of 
contingencies.  Project costs depend not only on the desired probability of success but also on 
budget allocation and contingency management.  This is in contrast with both deterministic 
practices that allocate a percentage of the project baseline cost for contingency as well as 
today's de-facto probabilistic cost analyses that provide a cost contingency independent of the 
budget-allocation strategy.  The realistic modeling of cost uncertainties and the MAIMS principle 
provide a framework for developing a viable cost-management strategy for allocating baseline 
budgets and contingencies.  Based on this analysis, the project manager can maintain a 
realistic project-wide contingency and dynamically distribute it to the individual risks on an as-
needed basis.  Projects that implement dynamic cost-contingency management based on these 
principles are likely to achieve a higher probability of success and cost less. 
Introduction 
Real-world experience and intuition both suggest that project costs depend on many 
factors, including technical, organizational, and behavioral considerations.  Thucydides got to 
the very root of the cost-overrun problem over 2000 years ago when he stated, “Their judgment 
was based more on wishful thinking than on sound calculation of probabilities” (Augustine, 
1997, p. 255). 
In the 1990's, the Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. carried out a study which concluded 
that the following deficiencies in cost modeling and contingency management have been major 
contributors to both project high costs and overruns (Gordon, 1997):  
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 Hidden incentives in procurement  
 Hidden incentives in management styles 
 Failure to coordinate cost analysis and cost management 
 Use of invalid mathematics such as arithmetically summing uncertain cost elements 
instead of using statistical methods 
 Overlooking the "Money Allocated Is Money Spent" (MAIMS) principle 
The MAIMS principle accounts for the fact that projects rarely underrun their allocated 
budgets.  It is the money analog of Parkinson’s Law, “Work expands to fill the time allotted.”  
The principle is also in concordance with Goldratt’s observation that negative human behavior is 
a major cause of the project-scheduling problem.  Goldratt (1997) developed the Critical Chain 
Project Management (CCPM) as a management philosophy and solution that simultaneously 
reduces project duration and protects against schedule risk.  A key principle of CCPM is to 
aggregate task buffers at the project-level for use where and when needed.  But it also 
proposed the following guidelines for sizing buffers: (1) cut task duration estimates in half, and 
(2) add approximately 25% of the original estimate to the project buffer.  These guidelines 
appear to be rather arbitrary, and many technical managers are uncomfortable with them.  A 
number of simple alternatives to estimate and sum buffers have been proposed (Newbold, 
1998; Schuyler, 2001).  We think that their use is no longer justified because of the availability of 
simple Monte Carlo simulation tools such as @Risk® and Crystal Ball®.   
The premise of this paper is that a credible Probabilistic Cost Analysis (PCA) needs to 
integrate findings on human behavior with mathematically valid models and sound management 
techniques to obtain realistic cost estimates and achieve project success.  A key 
recommendation is that in order to deliver successful projects at an optimal cost project, 
management needs to allocate "reasonable" budgets to the cost-account managers and 
dynamically manage the cost-contingency funds as a risk portfolio at the program/project level.   
Proposed Modifications to Today’s Typical PCA 
 Assessing Uncertain Cost Elements 
R&D and complex engineering projects rely heavily on engineering/expert judgment for 
the assessment of uncertain cost elements.  Unfortunately, these subjective assessments are 
often performed in a rather ad-hoc manner, and they have been identified as a critical source of 
error in probabilistic risk analyses (Keeney & von Winterfeld, 1991).  The Direct Fractile 
Assessment (DFA) method has been investigated in numerous psychological experiments and 
found to provide one of the most reliable and least bias-prone procedures for eliciting uncertain 
quantities (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982).  We recommend that experienced analysts and domain 
experts determine the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for uncertain cost elements.  While other 
percentiles may be used, these seem to be highly practical (Dillon, John, & von Winterfeld, 
2002).   
 Fitting Cost Elements with Realistic Probability Density Functions (PDF) 
Uncertain cost elements are more appropriately modeled as continuous than discrete 
random variables.  We favor the use of the three-parameter Weibull distribution because it is an 
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open-ended function that can assume a wide variety of shapes (Kujawski, Alvaro, & Edwards, 
2004).  It is also more flexible than the three-parameter lognormal even though both are 
characterized by three independent parameters.  The use of more complex PDFs seemed 
unwarranted for fitting three subjectively assessed percentiles.  Analysts and assessors should 
always validate that they feel comfortable with the shape of the fitted distribution. 
 Incorporating the MAIMS Principle 
The MAIMS principle plays a significant role in PCA.  Once a cost element is allocated a 
budget, x* it becomes a random variable with minimum value x* rather than the lower range of 
the original PDF.  The cost element is then given by a PDF with a delta-like function1 (or spike) 
at x* that accounts for all random values less than or equal to x* and the original distribution for 
values greater than x*.  The associated Complementary Distribution Function (CDF) has a step-
function behavior at x* and is identical to the original CDF above x*.  The effect on the cost 
element is that its mean increases and its standard deviation decreases with increasing values 
of x*.  As a result, the MAIMS principle plays a significant role in budget management.   
 Modeling Specific Risks 
The above PDFs provide a macroscopic rather than a microscopic view of the project 
cost risk.  They effectively model those factors or project characteristics that are ever present 
and contribute to cost uncertainties.  But complex projects often involve a number of critical 
decisions and high-impact risks which call for explicit risk-mitigation actions.  A detailed PCA 
should incorporate both the macroscopic and microscopic views to ensure that all risks and cost 
uncertainties are addressed and that the risk-reduction activities are transparent (Chapman & 
Ward, 1997).  The analysis of specific risks and risk-response actions requires a microscopic 
view and is best carried out using tools such as decision trees, influence diagrams, or other 
discrete representations (Kujawski, 2002a).   
 Modeling Correlations 
Cost elements are correlated because project characteristics (such as complexity, 
criticality, management, staff, and processes) are likely to impact multiple cost elements at the 
subsystem and system levels.  Also, the realization of any one risk is likely to influence other 
risks and to increase their probabilities and/or consequences.  Kujawski, Alvaro, and Edwards 
(2004) have developed a Two-Level Correlation Model (TLCM) which greatly reduces the 
number of parameters needed to specify a mathematically valid and physically realistic 
correlation matrix.  In its simplest form, it models correlations among cost elements of the same 
and different subsystems with only two parameters, int and ext.   
Application to a Representative Design and Engineering Project 
To investigate the concepts and issues discussed in the previous sections, we consider 
a hypothetical project with three level-2 cost elements (project/system-level and two 
                                                
1 Caution: The MAIMS-modified PDFs are not the same as the Crystal Ball® and @Risk® 
truncated PDFs.   
  
                  Acquisition Research: CREATING SYNERGY FOR INFORMED CHANGE     - 555 - 
 
 
subsystems) each with three level-3 cost elements.  Figure 1 depicts different budget-allocation 
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Figure 1.  Illustrative Impact of Different Budget Allocation Strategies on Project Cost 
Note: The cost elements are modeled with Weibull distributions fitted to the 10th, 50th, and 90th 
fractiles.  The cost correlations are modeled using the two-level correlation model with parameters of 0.6 
and 0.4.   
The “ideal curve” corresponds to the model where the project staff rationally spends 
money only as necessary to satisfy the project requirements.  In this ideal world, the actual 
costs may be less than the budgeted costs, and the savings are available to support other 
project elements on an as-needed basis.  In the MAIMS_@_X50 and MAIMS_@_X75 curves, 
all cost elements are allocated equal percentiles of 50% and 75%, respectively.  The 
MAIMS_@_mean curve corresponds to the case in which each cost element is allocated its 
mean or expected value.  Each cost element is then budgeted at a percentile that depends on 
the shape of the assessed PDF.  The MAIMS effects increase with higher allocated budgets and 
are substantial over a wide range of Probability of Success (PoS) values of interest to PCA.   
Budget Allocation, Contingency, and Project Cost 
Our objective is to integrate the presented concepts into a sound methodology for 
determining an optimal as well as realistic Total Estimated Cost (TEC) and budget-
allocation/management strategy for a given PoS.  The combination of cost uncertainties and the 
MAIMS principle complicates the situation.  As we have shown, the TEC depends not only on 
                                                
2 The calculations were performed using Crystal Ball and 10,000 trials.   
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the desired PoS but also the budget allocation and the management of contingencies.  The 
project cost cannot be estimated until the cost management strategy—including budget 
allocation—is specified.  We like to think that this contains a flavor of the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle. 
Much has been written on cost contingency; but there is still much confusion (Baccarini, 
1999; INCOSE, 2003).  To shed additional light on the subject, we express the Management 
Cost Contingency (MCC) in a form that exhibits its dependence on the PoS and the cost 
management strategy: 
MCC(PoS, PBC1,…, PBCn)   TEC(PoS, PBC1,…, PBCn) – PBC. 
PBCi is the baseline budget for cost element Ci, and PBC is the probabilistic sum of all 
the project cost elements.  The above relationship contrasts with both (1) the deterministic 
practice that allocates a percentage of the PBC as MCC, and (2) today's typical PCA that 
provides a MCC that is independent of the budget-allocation strategy.  Figure 2 depicts the 
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Figure 2.  Impact of Different Cost Management Strategies on the Cost and Contingency 
for the Project in Figure 1 
Figure 2 contains valuable information for both the procuring activity and the contractor.  
The budget management strategy has a significant impact on the TEC for a given PoS.  The 
effects of the MAIMS principle increase with increasing budget allocations and are substantial 
for all but the very highest PoS values.  The MAIMS principle has little impact at the very high 
confidence levels (CL > 95%) because each contributing cost element must then be near its 
maximum or 100th percentile value.  These results have important implications for cost 
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management.  For example, sizeable cost reductions are achieved by allocating budgets to the 
cost elements at the 50% CL rather than the 75% CL.  The standard PCA that assumes an 
“ideal” project provides a false sense of confidence; it may be a major source of cost overruns 
even for projects with high contingencies.   
Why Projects Even with High Cost-Contingencies Often Fail 
Consider a hypothetical request for proposal for the project3 depicted in Table 1.  To 
level the playing field, the procuring activity specifies that all bids should provide the 50% CL 
cost.  Contractor A has a certain level of sophistication.  He4 prepares a typical PCA with every 
bid; but he is not cognizant of the MAIMS principle.  He performs today's typical PCA and 
obtains the CDF in Fig. 2 labeled “TEC Ideal” and a P50 TEC of 7,348 K$.  Based on this 
analysis, Contractor A submits a bid of 7,348 K$ and rationalizes that the proposal is 
conservative given that the P50 value is 30% above the low estimate of 5,633 K$.  But because 
of the MAIMS principle, Contractor A's risks are significantly greater than he thinks.  Once the 
contract is awarded, management proceeds to baseline and allocate budgets to the cost 
elements at their mean values.  Given that the cost elements are budgeted at their mean 
values, the TEC is really given by the CDF in Fig. 2 labeled “PEC MAIMS_@_mean,” the P50 
TEC is 8,071 K$, and the PBC of 7,665 K$ is the lowest achievable cost.  To management’s 
surprise, this value is 317 K$ less than the proposal bid of 7,348 K$.  Because of the MAIMS 
principle, there is a negligible likelihood that Contractor A, given his practices, can deliver the 
project for the submitted bid of 7,348 K$.  Table 1 summarizes this and several other scenarios.    
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$K 
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$K 




  20% 7,673 0 0% 20% 6,445 -1,220 -16% 0% 
Mean 50% 8,071 406 5% 50% 7,348 -317 -4% 0% 
  80% 8,987 1,322 17% 80% 8,626 961 13% 73% 
  20% 7,111 0 0% 20% 6,445 -557 -8% 0% 
50% CL 50% 7,692 690 10% 50% 7,348 346 5% 37% 
  80% 8,771 1,769 25% 80% 8,626 1,624 23% 77% 
  20% 8,466 0 0% 20% 6,445 -2,021 -24% 0% 
75% CL 50% 8,613 147 2% 50% 7,348 -1,118 -13% 0% 
  80% 9,330 864 10% 80% 8,626 160 2% 52% 
Table 1.  Some Summary Data for the Different Cost Management Strategies Depicted in 
Figure 2 
Similarly, when considering specific technical risks, the common-sense and 
mathematically valid solution for efficient-cost risk management is to maintain a project-wide 
contingency and to distribute it to the individual risks on an as-needed basis.  This approach to 
                                                
3 This is the same illustrative project used for Figures 1 and 2. 
4 Gender neutral 
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managing project technical risks may be thought of as a variant of modern portfolio theory 
(Markowitz, 1991).  The implication to managing project is that less attention should be given to 
the individual risks (substituted for stocks) and more to the project (substituted for portfolio) as a 
whole (Kujawski, 2002b).  CCPM formalizes analogous concepts and their implementation for 
project schedule planning and management. 
Concluding Remarks  
This paper develops a practical and sound framework for quantifying the influence of 
human behavior on project cost and efficiently managing project risks and cost contingencies.  
The key elements include: 
 The incorporation of the “Money Allocated Is Money Spent” (MAIMS) principle.  The 
probability distribution of each cost element is modified by setting all cost values less 
than the allocated budget to the allocated budget in the MCS. 
 The realistic assessment of cost uncertainties and technical risks using proven methods 
such as the Direct Fractile Assessment method, event trees and/or influence diagrams. 
 The realistic treatment of correlations among cost elements. 
 The probabilistic treatment of the cost elements and explicit representation of technical 
risks.  The analysis is readily performed using commercially available Monte Carlo 
simulation Excel add-ins. 
 The implementation of a project-wide cost contingency to ensure the contractually 
agreed-to or acceptable probability of success. 
 Contingencies held and managed at the project-wide level.  They should not be 
allocated at the task-level and held by individual subsystem managers.   
 A dynamic allocation algorithm with system-level oversight for managing project risks.  
However, individual technical risks are still managed by the responsible technical 
performers.  A database for tracking risks would provide a powerful tool for accurately 
watching and forecasting contingency allocations and for controlling adverse behaviors. 
All seven principles are necessary to ensure that adequate contingencies are available 
to mitigate all project risks and not just selected ones.  Projects that implement all seven 
principles are more likely to succeed and cost less.   
The author acknowledges that it takes effort to develop these more realistic models and 
that all models are only approximations to reality.  The single greatest challenge to the 
development and use of improved probabilistic cost analysis and dynamic budget allocation is 
the implementation of systems thinking at the personnel, organizational, and institutional levels.    
But given the magnitude of the cost overrun problem, there is no excuse for accepting the status 
quo; the benefits are likely to be significant.   
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